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OK,讨论一个法律问题,与其它无关

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发表于 2012-9-6 11:03 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
Think Simulation
climberA和climberB结组攀登(非商业活动),因为沟通失误,B以为A已经做好了保护,实际a只是到了,还没有做好保护,b开始攀登,脱落撞击导致死亡。

请熟悉中国法律并了解中国国情的朋友解答,双方打官司的话,A会被判负什么样的责任?会被判过失致死吗?还是别的,或者不承担责任?山上就两个人,没有第三方人证。

说实话,我和朋友分别咨询过不同的律师(现在执业),得到的结果却截然相反,我也搞不清楚,还是在天朝只能到时候看法官心情?

另外还可以分别的情况讨论,这个例子是沟通失误,其它还有的可能比方说操作失误(a或者b给对方的保护失效了),运动攀登的锚点被拔出(开线人要负责吗)等等,大家都可以假设。

另外,冬冬生前在自己的BLOG上写过类似的免责声明,这种类似的方式在法律上是否有效呢?

谢谢!
发表于 2012-9-6 12:08 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
我不熟悉法律。所以我不能回答只能评论和提出问题。各地打官司的后果好像很不一样,广州(?)某次户外活动因为洪水发生死亡,法官把所有在场人,包括幸存队员和遇难死者,都判了责任。北京发生的户外事故似乎更倾向于责任自负,我个人认为甚至有为明显懈怠的商业组织者开脱的倾向。但是也有某人送醉酒的朋友回家,结果朋友在家门口睡着冻死了,送人的人被判有责任的情况,这和我们平时想的并不一样。总之似乎不确定性很大。

你的问题很好,这些问题有没有明确答案都应该讨论一下。

一下还不知道从哪里说起,就按你的问题说,而且我只是按一般假设情形说,A领攀到保护站把自己固定好后会用口令告诉B(“安全”、“解除保护”之类),B解除保护并应该告诉A“保护解除",然后等着A抽上去全部余绳(也就是松绳)。A收进余绳,开始保护B,用口令告诉B“保护开始”,B听到A确认保护开始后回复“开始攀登”并开始跟攀。B跟攀是会发现绳子是不断往上收的,而且自己爬得太快,绳子上有了多余应该慢下来等着收紧(任何上方保护的情形都该是这样)。只有很少见的情况B出现意外长距离坠落, 1:B没得到确认就开始跟攀,而且没有顾及绳子上产生的大段余绳,发生长距离坠落,2: B没得到确认就开始跟攀,而A这时还在收进余绳阶段,绳子虽然在往上走,但这时绳子一般不过保护器,如果B真在跟攀并脱落那会坠落很长距离。这两种情况前提都是B没得到保护开始的信号假设保护开始,而且A看不见B开始跟攀才能发生。经常发生的是相反的情形,A告诉B保护开始,B听不到而迟迟不跟攀。

为避免沟通问题攀登人一般都是先约定好口令交换,在听不清口令的地方用其他信号代替,比如A开始保护后告诉B“保护开始”但听不到B的“开始攀登”回复,就快速拉三下绳子,B没听到“保护开始”但发现绳子已经收紧,而且有三下快速拉动,则开始攀登但注意绳子是否继续往上收。我在这种情况不放心的话爬几米后还下攀一段,看绳子收紧能否完全承担我的体重。

可见严格遵循程序是很重要的,不但是攀登风险大的领攀人,而且是对相对安全的跟攀人。一旦习惯成自然了,遵循程序并不是难事。

免责声明在国外有点用但真的到了法庭是用处不大,诉方要是能证明被告有明显的严重疏忽直接导致损失,那有什么事先声明也不能避免被诉麻烦甚至被判负责。这就是为什么BD和Patagonia现在是两家公司,因为理论上造攀登器材的公司永远不能用任何方式完全规避被法庭认定负有主要责任的风险,并由此导致倒闭。

最好的策略就是避免出事,遵循可靠的程序,随时警觉。
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发表于 2012-9-6 12:32 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
除了海边腐蚀导致失效某些较软的石灰岩和砂岩上出问题,还没听说近10年来常用bolt、挂片在正常使用情况下失效的。要是真有失效一定有很特别的原因。假设锚点(2个挂片)都被拔出还不如遐想小行星撞地球。
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发表于 2012-9-6 13:56 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
本帖最后由 bince 于 2012-9-6 06:05 编辑

个人理解:
在非商业活动的前提下,由于沟通失效产生的事故由攀登者自己承担责任。事实上,在攀登过程中任何由于攀登行为和环境因素造成的事故都应该自己承担,除非有恶意的主观故意(如果是这样,已超出攀登讨论范畴)。即便是上方的攀登者无意踩下的石头伤及下方的攀登者,上方也不应有法律责任。

对在非商业路线上(也不包括人工岩壁)的保护点的质量的信任与否,应该完全由攀登者自行判断。一但你选择使用,应自行承担所有后果(应看作你自己给自己设置的保护)。

这中间很多细节很容易有争议,而且很难取证。如果真是这样,我倾向疑罪从无(可以有道德谴责,但不应有法律责任)。

所以选择信任的搭档,使用正确的攀登方式和器材,严格遵循程序,选择合理的路线非常重要,因为从你的双脚离开地面的一刻起,你的生命不再掌握在你自己手里,而后果则完全应由你本人承担。

但是,抛开法律责任的探讨,发生事故的攀登本身也需要好好还原并分析,这样也许可以避免类似悲剧的重演。
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发表于 2012-9-6 13:59 | 显示全部楼层

此跟贴有[岔开话题]嫌疑已转移至

born from the simulation
本帖最后由 bince 于 2012-9-7 02:26 编辑

法律声明[译文]
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 楼主| 发表于 2012-9-7 11:43 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
to mh,2个都被拔出的几率确实小,但一个被拔出的在白河我印象最少出过一起了,蜜蜂峡谷右侧的12线路,甘薯或者草叔冲坠拔出过一颗钉,歪裂的钉我印象里也出过问题,后来调整过。

从个人角度,我完全同意王大的看法,但责任认定的部分我觉的那只是一种climber的理想状态,不太可能在国内落地。如mh所言,国内的判决标准各个地区似乎不同,我们可以将事故原因区分为故意(恶意的)、错误(操作,程序上出了明显问题)、意外(冲坠撞击、落石)以及硬件问题(钉拔出,安全带断裂)等,这里面除了硬件问题可以明显取证外,其他的似乎在取证上都有困难,即使落石这样的意外,人踩落的和自然掉的,绳子挂的是否也有不同?我的律师同学告诉我刑法采取的是无罪推定,警察如果找不到证据证明有故意、错误,只能按照意外来处理,不承担刑事和民事责任。但朋友的律师似乎有不同说法,或者还有其他的判决标准?比如谁发起的这次攀登(所以才会流行偶遇)?另外,钉出问题造成了伤害是否开线人真的不会被追究到责任也应该请律师朋友好好分析一下,是否预先应该在白河基金官网上发出类似声明?

近几年我跟大约10个朋友一起爬过结组,其中一半的搭档都是以前只爬过单段,人生第一次结组,原来从来没觉的如何,现在看似乎有一点莽撞?因为配合少的人出问题的概率比配合多的理论上肯定大,这恐怕是为什么不少老炮从来只跟固定的搭档合作的原因?
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发表于 2012-9-8 08:56 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
本帖最后由 jane 于 2012-9-8 01:14 编辑

这里有个案例:Ro v. San Juan Mountain Guides
最后的结果是The suit was settled with a payout to Ro's widow in 2002, by which time Lowe had sold the ice festival to the Ouray Ice Park.

http://www.outsideonline.com/out ... /Risk.html?page=all

LATE ON THE AFTERNOON of January 17, 2001, Pete Ro, a 35-year-old climber on vacation from his job as public affairs manager for the American Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo, decided to try one last climb up the frozen Uncompahgre Gorge in Ouray, Colorado. Ro was taking an advanced ice-climbing seminar from Jeff Lowe, 52, the sport's preeminent figure, at the famous Ouray Ice Park, a mile-long playground of frozen waterfalls and icy overhangs. As twilight filled the shadowy gorge and most of the 22-person class packed up, Ro elected to take on a challenging 140-foot pillar of chandelier ice called La Ventana.

Lucy Creamer, 31, a noted British climber also taking the class, offered to belay him. Ro, Creamer, and Lowe agreed that when Ro safely reached the top of the route, he would unhitch and wait to be picked up at a nearby parking area on the vehicle-accessible upper rim of the canyon, rather than rappel down. As Ro swung his ice tools, Lowe scrambled up a nearby gully to a point where he could see both the top and bottom of the route and, as he later stated in a police report, "aid in communication" between his two students.

Ro climbed La Ventana in good style but was slowed by its difficult upper pillar. As he neared the top and disappeared from Creamer's sight, she shouted to ask if he had finished. Reports conflict about Ro's reply. Lowe and one other climber believe they heard him say "Off belay!" Creamer and another climber heard "OK!" In either event, Ro seemed to be acknowledging that he had topped out, which Creamer took to mean she could release the safety rope. (Language barriers were not an issue here. Though Ro lived and worked in Japan, he was born and raised in California and English was his native tongue.)

Creamer unhitched the rope from her harness. From his vantage point, Lowe recognized the dangerous confusion and tried to warn both Creamer and Ro. But he was battling bronchitis that day, and apparently his hoarse voice didn't carry. "In a matter of a few seconds, Pete was taken off belay," Lowe told the police, "and shortly afterwards he inexplicably leaned back, as though he expected to be lowered."

George McEwan, a 39-year-old Scottish climber enrolled in Lowe's seminar, was in a position to see what occurred next. "I heard a noise, looked up, and saw what I took to be a jacket falling through the air," he told the police. "It wasn't till Pete hit the deck that I realized what had happened."

Ro fell about 135 feet, landed on his right side, and lost consciousness within five minutes. He was pronounced dead on the scene at 6:05 p.m.

NINE MONTHS LATER, RO'S WIDOW, 31-year-old Hiroko Ro, sued Lowe, Creamer, and San Juan Mountain Guides, the sponsor of Lowe's seminar, charging gross negligence and asking for general and special damages totaling $10 million. The case one of a handful of sizable outdoor liability claims that go to trial in the United States in a typical year will get its first hearing in late June, at the federal district court in Denver.

Ro v. San Juan Mountain Guides is fascinating on a couple of levels. Like any large liability suit, Hiroko Ro's courtroom claim could have immediate, tangible reverberations if she wins. Colorado climbers are worried about the future of the Ouray Ice Park, a unique, volunteer-run ice-climbing area that charges no fees and operates on the patchwork of U.S. Forest Service, county, city, and private land that is Uncompahgre Gorge. Though a multimillion-dollar verdict wouldn't force the park to close it's operated by Ouray County and is protected under the Colorado Recreational Use statute, which limits the park's liability to $400,000 in case of a lawsuit it could adversely affect the 35 guides who operate there.

"A favorable judgment for Hiroko Ro would make their insurance premiums skyrocket," says Ouray Ice Park president Erin Eddy, 33. "And if they go up, it might stop them from guiding in our park."

If Ro prevails, the impact of her suit could be felt well beyond Colorado's borders, in large part because the sheer size of the award she's seeking dwarfs any recent outdoor liability decisions, but also because it has arrived at a time when outdoor guides are grappling with an equally serious problem: their difficulty in obtaining affordable liability insurance at all.

People like Jeff Lowe and companies like San Juan Mountain Guides don't have $10 million to pay Hiroko Ro, so by necessity they carry liability insurance in the event of a future lawsuit. Both are covered by Colorado Western Insurance Company in Wheat Ridge. In normal times, when the economy is on an even keel, a company like Colorado Western is not averse to insuring high-risk activities because it's making money in two different ways.

The most familiar is the combined ratio, or "float" the profitable difference between premiums taken in and benefits paid out. Less obvious, but more important, is the financial power of the stock market. During the bull market of the 1990s, insurers lowered their premiums and were more eager to cover sketchy ventures in order to increase the amount of investment capital they hauled in. Even if they collected, say, $100 in premiums and paid out $105 in benefits, their investments were sometimes returning a booming 25 percent $25 on that $100 premium so they realized a 20 percent profit.

The events of September 11 helped put an end to all that, at least for the foreseeable future. An insurance industry already experiencing acid reflux with every drop of the Dow went on an all-Tums diet when the World Trade Center fell. After peaking at $336.3 billion in 1999, the industry saw its net worth fall to $289.6 billion by the end of 2001, according to the Insurance Information Institute. The insurers who backed the WTC spread their risk through a worldwide network of reinsurers, so nearly every insurance company will pay a little piece of the estimated $50 to $70 billion that add up to the largest property claim in history.

The upshot is a stingy insurance market, which immediately affects high-risk ventures. The last time outdoor companies encountered such a harsh climate was in the mid-1980s, when a similar mix of liability fright and stock-market droop threatened the health of the adventure industry. By 1986, a spate of liability-run-amok court judgments like the $650,000 paid to a suicidal man who sued the New York City Transit Authority because the subway train he jumped in front of failed to slow down had so spooked insurers that some companies couldn't find liability coverage at any price. Then came Black Tuesday October 19, 1987 when the stock market tanked, deepening the crisis.

"When times were good, a number of insurers came in offering cut-rate policies," recalls Exum Mountain Guides partner Peter Lev, 62. "When times got tough, they folded and left a lot of folks without insurance."

TIMES ARE TOUGH AGAIN. New York-based Frontier Insurance Company, known for its affordable outdoor liability coverage, was declared insolvent last October by the Superintendent of Insurance for New York State. TIG Insurance Group, another liability player based in Irving, Texas, has pulled back from the outdoor market almost entirely. (Asked to elaborate, a spokesperson for TIG would only say that the company is "currently changing the way we distribute our line.") Many other insurers who jumped into the adventure biz when times were good are now running for cover. "Up to 70 percent of the carriers once involved in outdoor recreation coverage are either no longer involved in it or are reducing their exposure," says one insurance executive who asked not to be named, but whose company focuses primarily on the outdoor industry.

The result? Escalating prices for coverage, when it's available at all. "If you've got an impeccable record, you can anticipate 15 to 30 percent increases in the coming year," says Michael Smith, a former vice-president of Marsh USA, the world's largest insurance broker. "There are clients who will see 100 percent increases or could be dropped outright."

Ask around, and you quickly find that both small outfitters and big-time guide services are feeling the pinch. Guides are reluctant to talk about insurance on the record, especially since so many operate on notoriously thin profit margins. But those willing to discuss the issue say it's been a brutal year for their bottom line. One independent rock-climbing guide in the Adirondacks recently saw his annual liability premium jump from $1,500 to $2,800. Garrison, New York-based Outward Bound USA, which guides more than 30,000 clients every year, just got hit with a 30 percent hike.

Jim Murton, who's run the Bingham, Maine-based rafting company North Country Rivers for 20 years, says he's also riding out a 30 percent bump in liability insurance this year. "I saw it coming last fall, but I didn't think it would be this bad," says Murton. "With our experience and safety record, I normally have some leverage to negotiate. But there was zero negotiating this year."

Another symbol of these rough times is the hard-luck case of Charlemont, Massachusetts-based Zoar Outdoor, one of the East Coast's biggest river-rafting, kayaking, and rock-climbing outfitters. When its original underwriter, Frontier Insurance, went bust, Zoar switched to TIG Insurance, only to have TIG downrated to such a degree that Zoar had to find another provider. Ultimately, Zoar's insurance bill went from $17,000 in 2000 to $27,000 in 2001, and company president Bruce Lessels expects another 25 percent rise this year.

Such costs will eventually trickle down to consumers as a price hike, but for many outfitters it's too late to adjust this season's rates. "We committed to our pricing for 2002 back in November," says North Country Rivers owner Murton. "Some outfitters may go with insurance add-ons, but we'll just eat the increase this year."

Beyond the financial squeeze, a few insurers are rewriting the rules, excluding employees and activities that they've covered for years. "The exclusions are starting to get a little overwhelming," says Jared Hopkinson, owner of Sawtooth Adventure Company, a Stanley, Idaho-based rafting, kayaking, and guide service. "This year our insurance company didn't want anybody under 25 driving our vehicles. Well, this is an industry where a lot of guides are in their twenties. It's making it more difficult for us to do business."

Is it possible to operate without insurance? Negative, say adventure-company owners. Most guide services in the West operate on federal land, and the U.S. Forest Service and National Park Service won't let anyone make a dime without adequate coverage. Those in the East often deal with private landowners and public utilities whose rules are just as strict. No policy, no play.

In the months ahead, more outfitters will be hit with sticker shock as their insurance policies come up for renewal. As exorbitant premiums eat into their revenues, prices will rise, customers may rethink those big trips they were planning, and the adventure industry will hit a few more bumps on the road to economic recovery. But the insurance crisis won't cripple the industry as long as insurers aren't suddenly tripped up by a big-ticket liability judgment. One for, say, $10 million.

THE PRECURSOR TO THE MODERN adventure lawsuit was a famous case that began on a warm summer day in 1929, when a man named James Murphy bought a ticket for the Flopper, an attraction at Coney Island's legendary Steeplechase Park. The ride was a herky-jerky moving sidewalk that threw its riders like a bucking bronco. Murphy hopped aboard, got thrown, cracked his kneecap, and sued.

The issue went before future Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo, then a judge in the New York State Court of Appeals, who rejected Murphy's claim so roundly that Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., Inc. became a standard case study in law school. Applying the English common-law principle of volenti non fit injuria he who consents cannot be injured Cardozo ruled that if you buy a ticket for the Flopper, you can't collect damages when it flops you. "The timorous," he concluded, "may stay at home."

That phrase set the tone for such cases until February 10, 1974, when James Sunday took a turn down the beginner's slope at Vermont's Stratton Mountain Resort. Sunday caught his ski on a hidden clump of brush and fell hard: He went down a 20-year-old novice skier, and came up a quadriplegic. Sunday sued, claiming negligence, and was awarded $1.5 million, sending a wave of panic through the ski industry.

The verdict in Sunday v. Stratton Corp. was a watershed because it was the first major reversal of the Steeplechase standard and it came at a time when outdoor recreation was exploding in popularity, drawing participants who looked at risk in new ways. In the fifties and sixties, most skiers were hardy outdoorspeople accustomed to ungroomed hills and frequent injury. The sport's fashionable boom in the seventies attracted people who were inexperienced, less adventurous, and more likely to sue over a broken leg. The courts decided they needed some level of protection. "The timorous no longer need stay at home," the Supreme Court of Vermont noted in its 1978 ruling on Sunday. "There is concerted effort to attract their patronage."

To survive the Sunday decision, outdoor-industry leaders lobbied lawmakers in recreation-dependent states like Colorado, Wyoming, and Vermont to pass recreation safety acts. The new laws held outdoor enthusiasts responsible for the inherent risks of their sports, weakening the effect of Sunday and strengthening the assumption-of-risk idea that had evolved from Murphy v. Steeplechase.

Similar laws are on the books today in 26 states, but recreation safety acts weren't enough to protect outdoor businesses against future Sunday claims. Ski-resort owners, river runners, mountain guides, and wilderness educators had to change the very language they spoke. Still, it was a subtle change. The Sunday decision didn't require that businesses provide perfect safety for all outdoor activities. What it did require was that they be very careful not to put anything in writing that promised safety.

Charles R. "Reb" Gregg, a 66-year-old Houston attorney who is considered the dean of the outdoor bar, was one of the first lawyers to see the danger in promising safety. Gregg has represented the National Outdoor Leadership School since the 1970s and coedits the Outdoor Education & Recreation Law Quarterly. He is famous in risk management circles that is, those insurers, lawyers, and safety managers who monitor the outdoor industry with an eye toward keeping employees and clients injury-free for his mock-trial cross-examinations. In these, he plays the part of an attorney for an injured client, puts an adventure company CEO on the stand, and blows holes in the language of the company's brochures.

"I'm reading here where it says, 'Safety is our number-one priority,'" he'll say. "This is your brochure, is it not?"

Yes, says the CEO.

"And later in the same document you talk about clients coming to this program 'to take risks.' Is that right?"

Yes again.

"Now, my dictionary defines safety as" here Gregg holds up Merriam-Webster's Collegiate for effect "'free from harm or risk.' I wonder if you'd choose one or the other, because you can't have both."

Whatever choice the CEO makes, he loses. Because Gregg's follow-up goes like this: "Then you didn't tell your client the truth, did you?"

The word safe, Gregg explains, misrepresents what an outdoor experience should be. "We don't avoid the risk of harm, we embrace it," he says, speaking of the outdoor adventure industry as a whole. "So what we had to do was eliminate the term 'safety.'"

In the wake of the Sunday decision, outfitters expunged promises of safety from their brochures and liability waivers, and replaced them with warnings about the risks their clients would face on their excursions. The blunter and more graphic the information, the better.

"Clients often hear what they want to hear," says Preston Cline, 35, a wilderness risk consultant and director of Adventure Incorporated, a Gloucester, Massachusetts-based company that works with outfitters and experiential education groups. "An organization's brochure may have vague statements about how you can get yourself killed doing this. But what a client reads is: Ooh, how exciting, how challenging. So that organization has to be more and more abrupt about saying: 'Look, these are all the ways you really could die doing this program.'"

That shift from a "sign here" formality to a candid briefing on risk has made the liability release much more difficult to dismiss in court. "I still hear people say a release isn't worth the paper it's written on," says Gregg. "That just isn't true. A well-crafted release will almost always hold up."

BEFORE HE STRAPPED ON HIS crampons, Pete Ro signed two liability waivers releasing Jeff Lowe and San Juan Mountain Guides from responsibility if he were injured or killed during the seminar. How, then, can his widow sue? Because as powerful as they are, liability waivers cannot (and should not) prevent people from seeking relief when their guides have behaved with gross negligence, which the law defines as "willful and wanton" actions that indicate a high degree of recklessness.

Gross negligence is a pretty high bar to clear, so the first move by Ro's lawyer has been to try to get the liability waivers thrown out of court, in which case he'll only have to prove that Lowe acted with simple negligence that is, the failure to use ordinary care. (If negligence is overlooking a client's frayed harness, gross negligence is getting drunk and waving a loaded .44 around the campfire.) To do that, he'll likely take direct aim at the very nature of release forms.

These forms were generally toothless until the early 1980s, when the words "fully cognizant" turned things around. The more a client knew about the dangers he faced going in, the better the release fared in court. "I get awful picky when I draw up releases," says Jim McCarthy, 69, a Wyoming attorney and former president of the American Alpine Club who often represents guides and guide services. "I want clients to initial the four or five key paragraphs so later when they say, 'Oh, they stuck the form under my nose but I didn't read it,' you've got their initials there in six different places."

Did Pete Ro correctly sign his release? Jeff Lowe's attorney, Denver lawyer Monty Barnett, thinks so. Ro signed the first release two months before the seminar and the second the day before he died. (On Barnett's advice, Lowe declined to comment for this article.) Hiroko Ro's attorney, San Francisco lawyer Walter Walker, disagrees. In pretrial documents, Walker describes the two releases as "a mishmash of exonerations that are clear to no one" and claims that Ro signed the second release under duress. Since he had spent a lot of money and time to get to the ice-climbing school, the argument goes, he basically had to sign whatever was put in front of him to experience his vacation.

"San Juan Mountain Guides [had] Mr. Ro in a box when he arrived in Ouray," Walker argues in court papers. "Where else was he, a resident of Japan, going to go? How was he going to find another masters seminar?"

If the release holds, Walker will be forced to press on with the difficult task of proving that Lowe one of the world's most respected ice-climbers behaved with gross negligence. He claims that Lowe crossed this line when he assumed the role of go-between for Ro and Lucy Creamer. The reason? Lowe's bronchitis impeded his ability to help when he saw trouble. "Lowe knowingly and voluntarily chose to take on this safety role in his incapacitated condition," asserts Walker. This decision, he claims, constitutes "willful and wanton negligence."

Barnett scoffs at this argument. "The allegation about Jeff Lowe's voice is a red herring," he counters. "That had nothing to do with the accident, period. There is absolutely no negligence, even if we didn't have a release."

Lowe, however, may also be a victim of bad timing. In recent years two equal and opposing ideas have percolated through separate state court systems. One call it the Wyoming Principle, after the state whose judges have upheld it holds that instructor misjudgment is part of the inherent risk of any outdoor activity. The other call it the California Principle, because it's gathering steam in that trend-setting state maintains that an instructor bears a heightened duty to protect his students from harm. Those ideas came into direct conflict the moment Pete Ro died.

Reb Gregg, who is not involved in the Ro lawsuit but represents clients who might be affected by it, champions the Wyoming Principle. "We're arguing for cutting the instructor a little slack," says Gregg. "One of the toughest concepts for people to get their arms around is the difficulty of making just the right decision in a wilderness environment. A jury will inevitably search for the right response. But there's a gap between the drop-dead right answer and a reasonable answer. What I'm saying is that a decision may ultimately prove to be wrong, but that doesn't mean it was unreasonable. And being wrong is not the same as being careless or negligent."

Still, recent liability cases in California have established that a coach or instructor may have a heightened responsibility when it comes to risk. In one case, a high school swimmer who was paralyzed when he followed his coach's instructions to dive into the shallow end of a pool won $11.5 million from the school district.

"A coach has a heightened responsibility when it comes to those risks," says Walker. "We feel that's the case with Jeff Lowe. If you enhance the natural risk of a physical activity, you can be responsible for that."

THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM IS THIS: foreknowledge. Successful risk management requires not just the best gear and guiding smarts but a clientele that has been briefed to the point of information overload. You can never be certain about an outcome but you can be fully prepared.

"You have to understand the risks in order to make the best safety decisions," says Daryl Miller, 58, head of mountaineering operations at Denali National Park. In 1995, Miller and his rangers began bombarding mountaineers with facts about the risks they faced on Mount McKinley; gradually a risk management system was put in place. Permit applicants now receive a brochure laying out the dangers in eight languages. Once in Talkeetna, the stepping-off point for all McKinley expeditions, climbers attend a mandatory preclimb PowerPoint briefing. Rangers fresh off the hill give them route conditions, weather and avalanche forecasts, and glacier information and they hammer home the point that there is no right of rescue.

The results have been dramatic. On a mountain notorious for attracting hairball climbers and atrocious weather, accidents have declined every year since 1995. McKinley hasn't had a climbing fatality since 1998.

Nobody likes to give the death talk. It takes guts to harsh the pretrip high, to tell a roomful of people who've signed $5,000 checks that, if something goes wrong, they could die a slow, painful death in the middle of nowhere. But as Miller has found out, it's the most honest advice a guide can give a client. "One of the things I tell all climbers is that people who fail to recognize and respect the elements will lose their life," he says. "The wilderness is unforgiving. It doesn't care about your résumé."

Lawsuits like Sunday v. Stratton Corp. and Ro v. San Juan Mountain Guides may work in a similar way to actually deepen the outdoor experience in America. By making us acknowledge the risks we can expect to encounter, they force us to reckon with the basic question of outdoor adventure: What are we willing to risk and what do we hope to gain?

"The real art of risk management is knowing how to have that candid exchange without freaking out both sides," says risk consultant Preston Cline. "The point is to protect the clients by not lying to them. And if you tell them it's safe, you're lying to them."
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发表于 2012-9-8 09:22 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
回复 7# jane
法律本就难懂,您还来段大篇幅的西文。。。
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发表于 2012-9-8 12:05 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
nk,  蜜蜂和歪裂钉出问题的原因找出来了吗?是石头问题、安装问题、还是钉本身的质量问题?和车祸类似,攀登事故中器材装备出问题是少数,而且相对容易事后判断,多数时候是操作者失误和意外。白河基金做的事本身就是为了安全攀登,大家都很注意保证装置的安全性,这从各种公告、讨论、能收集传播bolt、挂片的一般安全性的资料就能看出来。要是能整理告知本地安全性问题的案例、明确表明力量有限,风险的确存在,自己安全终极有攀登者自己负责就更完全了。就是不懂攀岩的律师法官看了这些也会做出正确的判断。

追查谁发起的这次攀登很难说明问题,对一般互相了解的同伴“谁先发起”基本就是个谁碰巧先打电话的问题。

和经验不足的人一起攀登的风险和让别人搭自己的车类似,不出事大家很高兴,一出事就很麻烦。要很小心带完全没结组经验的人结组爬多段路线。这种情况下,我首先要保证这个人会保护,一般说自己能先锋爬单段线路的人才能比较完善领会怎么保护领攀人。爬之前要在地面上第一二个挂片间演示领攀-跟攀-领攀全过程,并且确认跟攀人能记得怎么自己操作,完全不会的人还是先去爬短的直接了当能互相看到的路线练习吧,比如beginner头一两段,甚至老岩场的儿童线,或者先让初学人和有经验的跟攀者一起跟攀学习。攀岩是个相当安全的活动,但前提是懂得并且执行前人经过长久总结得出的操作程序。如果跟攀人不是很有信心,或者没表现出对安全环节自发的警觉,我觉得还是爬一两段就下来的好。避免一人明确不太愿意另一人执意去的情况。

很多人作为领攀人爬了很长时间结组也还是不会处理复杂问题,比如跟攀人由于横摆或屋檐挂在绳子上,自己爬不上来也不能放下去,你作为领攀人会全靠自己把他拉上来吗?我爬多段总带Tbloc或抓结还有2米多长的Dyneema辅绳圈。我设置保护站时如果对跟攀人不完全放心就延长固定部分(一般用主绳)坐到能看见跟攀人的位置保护,甚至在一段中间多分一段。这些东西的积累和技术水平完全无关,有多得是的人能爬5.12但只会在很简单的环境下安全操作。除了去CMDI之类的培训课,怎么也比不过和不同背景的有经验的攀登者一起爬来提高自己攀登安全性和效率。对于有经验的人,教不会的人经常会让自己从基本原则上考虑问题,也是很有好处的。
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发表于 2012-9-8 15:56 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
"攀岩是个相当安全的活动,但前提是懂得并且执行前人经过长久总结得出的操作程序。"除了程序是否还有长久积累并形成共识的道德准则呢?
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发表于 2012-9-8 19:54 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
避免安全隐患,同时免除、降低法律责任的唯一方法就是提前演练和学习了。是否主观上,而且客观上有证据表明进行了足够的、合理的、正确的安全知识的学习、演练,估计是判断最终承担多少责任的基础。

比如AB两个人进行过相关学习,而且约定了上方保护者A一定要说,可以爬了,下方跟攀者B才可以爬(当然攀爬中的约定不止这一个),那么如果B违反约定导致事故发生,B为主要责任/全部责任。但同时A不见得能免除一切责任,因为结组攀登是互动的,保障安全的环节一个接一个。A的某些不明确的行为也可能会导致B产生误解。

如果AB两个人均没有进行过安全学习,那么A显然要负更大的责任了。

看过youtube后,就知道国外有关攀登的基本安全知识有多少资源可以共享了,我们这里太缺乏了!仅仅有登协的、CMDI的一些培训班。

如果哪位朋友愿意上镜,我们可以一起搞这些视频教学的内容。即便影片对安全的讲解是错误的,那么也正好可以通过讨论更新视频。
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发表于 2012-9-8 21:46 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
提供个人意见,不一定正确,但基本逻辑和法律原则应该不会有大问题。
提问涉及到几个层面的问题:
1、行为性质方面(1)是否承担刑事犯罪责任。(2)若不承担刑事犯罪责任是否承担民事赔偿责任。
2、证据采信方面,只有两人对质,一方已死亡的情况下如何认定证据,从而判断行为性质。
3、冬冬等人的免责声明是否有效。

个人意见如下:
1、行为性质方面。(1)过失致人死亡属于刑事犯罪范畴,基本构成是,行为人主观上能够预见他人可能死亡的结果,客观上有违反义务的过失性行为,且该行为和他人死亡之间具有因果关系。NK的提问中,A如果无法预见B的行为,则A不负责(从提问中,应该是不能预见)。是否能预见要根据当时的场景结合一般人的经验认知进行综合判断。(2)不构成过失致人死亡的刑事犯罪,是否要承担一定的民事赔偿责任,主要也是看行为人是否有过错。如果认定有则可能要承担一定比例的赔偿。全无过错,则不承担。
2、证据采信。目前只有A的证言,那么只能根据A的证言寻找线索看客观线索是否能和其证言佐证,如果不能,则A证言可能有质疑的地方。但是除非能确切证明A的证言虚假错误,否则刑事犯罪认定是“事实存疑按照有利于被告人”的推定原则,即查不清的情况下,应根据有利于被告人的方法推定事实。
3、冬冬等人的免责宣言,要区分具体适用情况才能判定是否具有完全的免责效果。例如,他和他人自由结伴,只要他人非恶意,一般确实不负责。但是如果他参加一只商业队伍,即便他签署免责条款,但未必能免除组队方的责任,在组队方存在过失的情况下,仍然可能承担责任。
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发表于 2012-9-9 00:47 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
"攀岩是个相当安全的活动,但前提是懂得并且执行前人经过长久总结得出的操作程序。"除了程序是否还有长久积累并形成共识的道德准则呢?
w2 发表于 2012-9-8 07:56


比如说。。。?
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发表于 2012-9-9 01:40 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
如果AB两个人均没有进行过安全学习,那么A显然要负更大的责任了。
wowmac 发表于 2012-9-8 11:54


问题是学无止境,在哪里画条线就能判定定AB均有或没有进行过安全学习?所有人都多少学过,在正式和非正式场合。两个初学者一起看了杂志文章算是进行过安全学习吗?几个初学者找个经验多人的讲了一次算吗?一定要专业认定的教练讲吗?可即使是专业课程也有局限,也不可能教授所有情形下所有的对策。这个线是画不出来的。我更担心的是要是真的通过主管部门或法庭判例硬画出条线,比如通过某个考级才算安全,那是否会让高于这条线的人有高枕无忧的倾向(道德风险问题)?还有,攀登运动是在发展的,这个神圣的考级会不会成为锁链,更不用说权力部门会寻租这种权力。现在规定多少米以上登山要请教练就是恶例。

最后我不觉得两个没有学习过的人一起爬A显然要负更大的责任。A可能是碰巧技术水平高点或轮着他这次领攀的,A和B都没预见到事故发生。
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发表于 2012-9-9 01:56 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
胖鱼,谢谢分析。两人攀登某号称有1/N概率死亡的山,一个人出事了,另一个人是否因自己的参与这事而间接导致了事故,所以要负责,所以要被判有过失呢?
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发表于 2012-9-9 14:23 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
回复 13# mh
比如说给份隐去实名的事故报告来警醒后人?比如说科学的评估自己的攀爬能力和攀爬经验?比如说踏实遵守攀登的既定程序?比如每次出行的保险?
攀岩培训就像驾校,持有国家相关法律和部门颁发的证书理论上就可以教授攀爬的课程。接受培训并通过考试的就像驾校毕业的驾驶员,出来剐蹭,撞车,撞人理论上和驾校没关系。我们的现状是有驾校(cma,cmdi等)大多数人因为这种那种的原因不想参与,喜爱私下交流,这样带来的问题是没有明确的,统一的操作流程。你,我,他带出来或者交流来的攀登者在基础细节上的细小不同会带来的未知的不确定的后果。也许没说清,但这些问题确实存在。
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发表于 2012-9-9 23:50 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
胖鱼,谢谢分析。两人攀登某号称有1/N概率死亡的山,一个人出事了,另一个人是否因自己的参与这事而间接导致了事故,所以要负责,所以要被判有过失呢?

不会仅仅因为参与就认定过失,这种间接的条件关系也不是刑法意义上因果关系。
具体过失的认定会比较复杂,但大概的原则用生活化的用语解释,大概可以这样表述:你有能力尽到某种职责,且应当尽到某种职责但是你没有做到。
两人结组攀登,本来就是有风险的事情,两人明知风险而自愿参加,一人出事故,一般不会以此直接认定另外一人对阻止事故的发生具有责任。这里的责任一般是指在攀岩过程中的一些具体职责。例如,一般攀岩人都能预见到到某个点应该为队友打保护,但是你因为过于轻信不会有问题,没有打好保护,结果导致队友事故,这种情况,你可能是有责任的。
这种责任是否上升到刑事犯罪的过失致人死亡罪,可能是有争议的,我个人的倾向观点应该是不构成,仅仅是部分民事赔偿的承担责任问题,就个人有限所知,国内目前也尚无相关的刑事犯罪判例。
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发表于 2012-9-10 09:17 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
回复  mh
我们的现状是有驾校(cma,cmdi等)大多数人因为这种那种的原因不想参与,喜爱私下交流,这样带来的问题是没有明确的,统一的操作流程。
w2 发表于 2012-9-9 06:23


所以我们把东西摆在阳光下讨论。中国攀登群体逐渐理清自己法律责任和义务的路程是要中国攀登群体自己走的。官僚和商家们拿上风的经费收客户的佣金,他们不敢出面讨论的东西我们这里有空间讨论。
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发表于 2012-9-10 12:45 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
回复 17# 胖鱼

你的分析我觉得很有道理。“你有能力尽到某种职责,且应当尽到某种职责但是你没有做到... 这里的责任一般是指在攀岩过程中的一些具体职责。”这对判定很多情形都是明了的。是不是能这么么说,一个人应不为“明知山有虎必向虎山行”这事本身负法律责任,而只为具体执行细节负责。用我前面的例子,其中关键是他们去爬“号称有1/N概率死亡的山”,法庭不接受死亡概率是1/N客观的必然的,因为如果接受,那可以对幸存者说:“显然你要是不去,你的同伴不会冒这1/N的险,现在这1/N真的发生了,那么不论细节如何你要担责" 。据我了解,这个在美国和法国是很不同的,美国倾向但凡冒险任何有一点关系的人都有潜在责任,法庭接受责任诉讼很多,法国民意和法律基本是认为只要给别人不带来直接损失,普通人爱干什么随便,自己对自己负责,探索和冒险人自由度大得多,我看原因是欧洲人亲身体会到要不是当初有人冒着九死一生的风险出海,现在大家还以为地球是平的。不过中国有抓人连坐的传统,在很多人看来鼓励探索的好处不是显然的(比如明朝的禁海的结果要等400年后的鸦片战争才看出来,有人至今也没看出来),有这样的背景,不知会怎么样。

另外,你说的
例如,一般攀岩人都能预见到到某个点应该为队友打保护,但是你因为过于轻信不会有问题,没有打好保护,结果导致队友事故,这种情况,你可能是有责任的。
这里似乎“一般攀岩人”的观点不好作为判定有责任没有责任的准绳,因为怎么判定“一般攀岩人都能预见到到某个点应该为队友打保护”呢?在攀登中“一般攀岩人”不可能出现在此时此地,考虑到时间的紧迫、队员的现实状态能力、天气的变化... 等因素为当事人综合判断会不会有问题。我们经常要靠自己的判断做取舍,很大程度上攀登安全是个自己做决定控制自己命运的运动,这也是为什么有人说攀登是生活的浓缩。如果真要追究当时是否有责任,我能想出的最接近可能实施的办法是象判定医疗事故那样找一组有经验的人来评是否当事人处置合理,但这么办的有效性在只有一个幸存人的情况下也很难说。
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发表于 2012-9-10 22:21 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
回复 19# mh


    话说你们的讨论是不是有点偏离现实啊。

    美国、欧洲的法律不管差别有多大,基本原则都是一样的:公平。

    中国的法律实质原则是:多一事不如少一事,息事宁人为上,只要不关我事。

    只要能平息死伤者家属的怒气,别让他们来闹事。就判你全责也成啊。“什么公平不公平的,关我屁事”。
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发表于 2012-9-11 00:53 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
你要是那个可能被判全责的,关你的不止是屁事。

你要是那位家属,弄个明白可能比判个陌生人全责更消怒气。

你要是那个法官,担心审得不合适,你可能也想了解一下。

我们写下这些,写给那些过去、现在、将来可能关心的人看。
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发表于 2012-9-12 09:20 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
回复 21# mh


    “什么公平不公平的,关我屁事”~~~这话是指审判者,合议庭的人的思想,不是指我。

    现实的例子天天在上演,类似的交通事故判罚案例笔笔皆是。这是现实。

    希望有一天公平的概念能在人心普及。
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发表于 2012-9-12 10:25 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
我知道你不是说你。我的写的是给大多数的不出现的和还没出现的人。
法官也不都一样,北京的近几年的案例都倾向于认为人在户外就接受户外的风险。我们把各方的观点说了,他们在调研案子的时候就可能看到。
Jane贴的英文文章里把美国的户外责任诉讼历史说得很细,各方观点有多个回合的较量。美国比中国超前了几个阶段,不能说美国的例子没价值,实际上中国户外从90年代末到现在走过了美国的1920年代(个人背着煎锅宿营)到2010年代(跨国企业支撑的复杂系列极限活动),所以几年前还觉得遥远的案例现在就摆在眼前了。比如上面那个英文文章中从“Charles R. "Reb" Gregg...”开始的几段说美国意识到组织者应避免提“保证安全”,因为在法庭案例教训说明这是给自己挖了个坑。而我们现在就能找到身边例子. 这是和我们有关的。
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发表于 2012-9-12 23:29 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
回复 6# nk

你所说的这两次关于断钉的事故,我都是当事人(之一)。先是在蜜蜂峡谷右侧岩壁最右边?的线路,我保护甘叔攀爬,他冲坠过程中把一颗钉冲飞了,挂片套在在自己的快挂中,快挂连在8字结处,螺母飞了,螺杆完好,还在岩壁上。貌似一两周后,我和噢乖攀爬歪瓜裂枣,第2还是第3段,一个浅屋檐下,我掏出快挂正要挂进挂片,突然螺杆断裂(我没有用力拉拽,轻碰而已),螺母飞了,螺杆断裂位置在孔洞表面退进去2-3毫米处。挂片套在快挂上,快挂握在手里,好在当时没慌,右上移动找到一丛灌木,套扁带做为安全铆点继续上攀。登顶后跟小河通电话,告诉详情,河老师隔周就去修补了这颗钉。认为可能是安装钉时铆的过紧,造成螺杆内部脆裂,或者是该颗螺杆本身件体内有气泡,为不合格产品。此后,我杜绝只有一颗钉的顶绳攀爬。
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发表于 2012-9-15 18:01 | 显示全部楼层
Think Simulation
哈哈,基本同意mh的分析。新刑事诉讼法增加了一种证据形式,叫做专家证人意见,碰到这类案件我倒是觉得可能可以的。
不过,很坦率的说,我只从刑事犯罪的基本原理出发分析你说的案件。一般人的基本认知是刑事犯罪认定中的一个基本标准,但是关于这种认知的具体标准(应当结合客观环境具体情形判断一般人的认知,还要考虑当事人认知水平的特殊情况等等),以及在具体的案例中究竟应当怎么评判,证据如何采信,实际上是一个很复杂的问题的。所以我只能简单谈谈抽象的原则,帮助不大,我就不再赘述啦。倒是从大家的帖子中学习了不少,拜读啦。
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发表于 2012-11-18 14:57 | 显示全部楼层
born from the simulation
问题是学无止境,在哪里画条线就能判定定AB均有或没有进行过安全学习?所有人都多少学过,在正式和非正式 ...
mh 发表于 2012-9-9 01:40


Hoho, 我前面说过了:“客观上有证据表明进行了足够的、合理的、正确的安全知识的学习、演练”,这就是进行过安全学习了。
至于拿本杂志文章看看,那还需要具体看文章内容是什么,怎么个“看看”,以及当事人其他方面的知识水准,这个就得具体情况具体分析了。

就具体案例来讲,运动攀的结组中的安全知识,不是复杂到凡人不可理解的地步的。当然,如果有个证书,某官方发布的,这个在法庭上,明显是比较确凿的一个证据,比若干个攀登高手按手印证明这个人安全知识与意识已经过关、足够值得信任要直接得多。

AB,无论谁,只要是处在实施保护的状态,都应该是负有主要责任的,如果另外一方冲坠受伤致死。是否能降低责任的承担度,那就有各种理由可以呈堂由法庭来判断了。
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